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Politicalldentific·ation and the Differend
Peter Banki
At the end ofa long and scrupulous essay addressing the question
of Martin Heidegger's politics, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe asks:
Why would the problem of identification not be, in general,
the essential problem of the political (Lacoue~Labarthe 1989:
300)?
Rather than end with a statement, a thesis, Lacoue-Labarthe
concludes his essay with a question - an interesting question,
posed in an unusual way. This question arises out of a reading
that carefully situates the difficulty of analysing Heidegger's
politics in the wake of the radicality of his philosophy. To the
extent that Heidegger grounds his understanding ofthe political
in the ontico-ontological difference, that is to say, in a difference
that he claims to have been forgotten from the very beginning of
Western thought, Heidegger's particular determination of the
political- of 'the essence ofthe political' - would impose itselfas
more fundamental (and thus more powerful) than any inherited
concept ofpolitics that one might try to oppose to it. ThlJs, for
Lacoue-Labarthe, an external reading is disqualified in advance
- unable to grasp either the political implications ofHeidegger's
thought, or what in this thought made possible his political
commitments.
Now the problem ofidentification (inseparable from that
of mimesis) appears in the course of Lacoue-Labarthe's essay as
one that would not be disqualified by the radical character of
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Heidegger's questions. Rather, it would seem to he implied
(although in a manner as yet uninterrogated) _at the point where
his thought and his politics are in closest proximity:
An unacknowledged mimetology seems to overdetermine the
thought of Heidegger politically. This remains to be shown. It
leaves us, today at any rate, with a question: Why would the
problem ofidentification not be, in general, the essential problem
of the political? (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989: 300)
Although this marks the end ofthe essay, Lacoue-Labarthe defers
signing off. He adds a footnote, which situates the question if
not 'beyond' the horizon of the problems posed by Heidegger
(in every sense), then in juxtaposition to them, at a certain
threshold or limit.
This footnote is a self-citation - or more precisely,- a citation
of self-and-other - in which Lacoue-Labarthe sets the question
'against the background' of work on Freud carried out in
collaboration with Jean-Luc Nancy. He cites two texts, ofwhich
only one (to my knowledge) is translated into English (Nancy &
Lacoue-Labarthe 1981) 1997). These texts interrogate the psycho-
analytic concept ofidentification in terms ofthe Freudian analysis
of culture. The analysis ofculture (undertaken towards the end
of Freud's life) is interpreted- as a limit of psycho..analysis, where
questions concerning the institution of authority and the
-emergence ofthe subject are left unrecondled (Nancy & Lacoue-
Labarthe 1997: 1-8).
Situated in this manner then, at the end ofone paper while
directing the reader to two others, Lacoue-Labarthe's question -
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that proposing the problem of identification -as the "essential
problem ofthe political (Iepolitique) - marks a point oftransition
between the analyses of two heterogeneous discourses. In the
terms ofJean~FranlioisLyotard, one might say that it testifies to
a difftrend.
A diffrrend is a limit ofdiscourse which occurs when there
is an untranslatability between different kinds ofargumentation
- at the most elementary level, between different ways oflinking
sentences, according to specific rules. From this untranslatability
there results a conflict, a dispute, which is the consequence of
the lack of a single rule (or 'phrasal regime' (regime- de phrases»
having a universal authority to judge between them (Lyotard
1983: 9-10). To consider, for example, the diffirend in question
here: Heidegger's 'ontology' - at least the Fundamental Ontology
of Being and Time - wQuld identify psycho-analysis as a
psychology, that is to sa~ a 'regional ontology', inasmuch as it
investigates the character of a particular entity (the mind or
psyche) without having first clarified the meaning of Being in
general (Heidegger 1962: 1-33). With regard to the priority of
Heidegger's investigation, therefore, the concerns of psycho-
analysis would remain secondary and derived. And yet, while
psycho~analysis does indeed present itselfas an empirical science
(although ofa very special kind, as the science ofthe unconscious,
it distinguishes itselffrom psychology), there is nevertheless a
potent resemblance between certain ofits topics of investigation
and those found, for example, in Being and Time (notably, the
,Unheimlich' and original 'being-guilty' (Schuldigsein) (Heidegger
1962: 1390. While Freud claimed to have 'carefully avoided any
contact with philosophy proper' - an avoidance 'greatly facilitated
by my constitutional incapacity' he wrote in theAuto~Biographical
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Study - in the same text he nevertheless .avowed a tendency to
(speculation', which, as a genre of discourse, can stricto sensu be
understood neither as philosophy not as scientific or clinical
experimentation (Derrida 1987a: 264-272).
If it is plausible to speak ofa difftrend between Heidegger
and Freud (a single one, between two discourses presumed to be
unified and consistent in their argumentation), this diffrrend
would also have a political resonance. This is most unmistakable
in relation to the rise of Na~ism in Europe during the 19305.
Although these two thinkers lived and wrote at the same time
and in the same language, to all appearances they never read one
another or corresponded. If in general a relation between them
does take place, it would be in a kind of interval where each
remains "'out of date' with regard to the other - a 'singular
anachrony' which allies them perhaps only more deeply and more
powerfully (Derrida 1987a: 191). However, with the rise of
Nazism) each is forced to respond (albeit from radically different
positions) to the same historico-political given. If they are not
contempories ofone another, they are nevertheless contempories
of totalitarianism, that is to say, in Lyotard's terms, ofa discourse
which posits a universal idea as the absolute rule for the judgement
of reality (Lyotard 1983: 18).
For Heidegger, as is well known) the response takes the
for~ ofa 'yes'. At once resolute and unambiguous, it is announced
publicly by his acceptance ofthe post ofRector of the University
of Freiburg in 1933. In his inaugural speech, 'The Self-
Affirmation of the German University', Heidegger identifies
himself as an intellectual and spiritual leader ofthe movement -
one who would play a v~tal role in the historical refoundation of
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Germany, promised by National Socialism. l In opposition to the
biologistk and racist doctrines of the movement, as well as to
the technical organisation ofknowledges in the modern universit}T,
Heidegger determines the 'self-affirmation' of the German
university as the will to its own essence, which is equally the will
to the historial spiritual mission of the German people (Volk):
'Science and German fate must come to power at the same time
in the will to essence' (Heidegger 1993: 30). Ntcr 1934, following
his resignation from the Rectorship, this 'yes' is attenuated, but
it is never denied (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 32). He is mistaken
about the reality of Nazism, but not its 'internal truth and
greatness'.2
In 1945, after the end of Second World War and the
liberation of the camps, he will continue to speak of the historial
self-affirmation (Selbstbehauptung) ofGermany (Lacoue-Labarthe
1987: 85-86). In question is still the possibility of the se1f-
identification ofthe German people, oftheir accession to history;
to the greatness of their historical destiny, but with a certain
inflection: this will not be by means of science or knowledge
(Wissen) but through art, most particularl}', through listening to
the voice of HoJderlin. The historial mission of the poet is to
grant his language (Sprache) to a people - a language thought
most essentially as myth (Sage) - a myth which will permit the
people to accede to their own language, and situate itselfas such
in Histor}'. This turn to poetry (Dichtung), which apparently
depoliticises Heidegger's thought (inasmuch as it involves a
withdrawal from direct participation in the regime) is only an
inflection in his long-standing interpretation ofthe Greek techne,
that is to say, of the essence of modern technology. Not only
does this motif traverse all of Heidegger's discourses from 1933
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onwards, it will also determine in 1953 the manner in which ho
explains the expression 'the inner truth and greatness' ofNation~l
Socialism, ie 'the _encounter of global technology and modern
man' (Heidegger 1959: 199).
For Freud, the rise of Nazism also involves a political
decision or choice concerning his fate, although to employ the
terms of Heideggerian existentialism in this regard cannot be
without,irony. Freud's 'decision' to flee Vienna at the age ofeighty-
two is a scene whose eventuality is unthought - in fact cannot be
thought - in the terms of Heidegger's appeal to the self-willing
of the historial spiritual inission of the German Volk. Because
the Nazis do not recognize Freud as a member of the lfJlk, he
cannot accede to the possibility ofsuch a decision. The Nazi call
to self-identification has the paradoxical effect of stripping him
ofhis national identity, which is to say also, ofcivil and juridical
rights and protection. From the time of the Anschluss onwards
(1938), Freud is publicly identified (in a way that he doesn't
choose) by his religious origin, as is his science which becomes
its decadent and perverted expression.
All of which is to say that if the strategy of the Rektorats
Rede was precisely to oppose (or at least to correct) the naturalist,
biologistic and racist tendencies of the movement, if in joining
the movement Heidegger attempted to 'spiritualize' National
Socialism, he nevertheless did so in committing himself to a one~
siaed voluntarism, grounded in a metaphysics of subjectivit¥
(Paradoxically, this is just what in Beingand Time the thought of
Dasein as ek-static, as 'originally outside of itself, should Have
forbidden (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 115).) The political effect of
such a philosophical commitment (or rather compromise) is that
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in seeking to oppose the appeal ofthe Nazi ideologues to natural,
biological, racial forces, Heidegger reinscribes spirit in an
oppositional determination, which by the very complicity of
opposites comes back to haunt him. If the program of the text
seems diabolical, it's because it capitalizes in' a non-fortuitous
manner on two evils at once: the sanctioning ofNazism and the
gesture which is still 'metaphysical', ie the mobilization of a
concept ofthe people (volk) which restitutes a subject ofhistory,
that is to say, a stable identifiable entity or communal substance
which also belies the concepts of Dasein and Mitsein developed
in Being and Time (Derrida 1989: 39f).
Following this law ofthe complicity ofopposites, one might
suspect that if the rise of Nazism finds Freud and Heidegger
occupying polar opposite positions of the dyad Nazi/Jew, there
may also be a number of hidden similarities which complicate
and refine the difflrend that I am pursuing here. Freud's 'decision'
to exile himself from his home in Vienna, and in so doing to
displace the centre of the psycho-analytic movement, is also
accompanied by the writing of a text. This text, an 'historical
novel' says Freud, written between 1934-1938 and published in
London in 1939, addresses the enigmatic question ofthe hidden
origin of the Jewish people. Highly unorthodox, even eccentric,
in its formal construction and the manner in which it defends its
arguments, Moses and Monotheism pursues also a kind of
intellectual exile, where Freud quite consciously transgresses the
boundaries of his expertise as a psycho-analyst, as well as the
requirements of the academic disciplines from which he draws
his material (anthropology, history and archaeology). This is in
order to produce an investigation that 'can give no certainty that
we shall arrive at the truth', but 'will perhaps throw-light on
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problems which have always deserved attention' and which 'recent
events have forced on our observation anew' (Freud 1985: 351).
Without simply identifying himse1fwith the people ofIsrael (das
MJlk Israel) (although, as is well known, he never simply eschews
this identity), Freud will claim the authority (which amounts to
saying the possibility) ofthinking the conditions oftheir existence,
the reasons for their survival and the causes of anti-semitism.
In a manner similar to Heidegger then, Freud also
responded to Nazism by assuming the role ofan intellectual leader,
which is to say not only a leader of intellectuals, but a leader
inasmuch as an intellectual - responsible not only for his own
fate) but also for that of 'his' people in general. Although he
never joined a party or political group (throughout his life he
resisted appeals to support Jewish nationalism) ie. Zionism)) nor
did he authorize himselfwith a concept such as the 'philosopher
king' (as did Heidegger)) as leader of the psycho-analytic
movement, Freud nevertheless saw himselfas responsible for the
question of the existence of the Jews as a whole - precisely at a
moment of imminent crisis or disaster. To this question, he
sacrifices the disciplinary requirements which guarantee scientific
authority and protection) as he himselfwrites opening the preface
to the third section, 'with the audacity of one who has little or
nothing to lose' (Freud 1985: 295) - a gesture which recaUs what
Bataille labels 'the practise ofjoy hefore death') or Blanchot 'the
risk of the inessential'. By the circumstances of its publication
and the manner in which it breaks with convention (carefully
archived in the prefaces to each section, the author being 'unable
to wipe out the traces of the worKs origin' (Freud 1985: 349)),
certain commentators have suggested a hidden identification on
the part of the author with the hero of his text, Moses, who, as
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lead.er of the Jews, gives birth to them as a people by delivering
them from bondage in Egypt (Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe 1997:
25f, Yerushalmi 1991: 60, 74-76, 79, de Certeau 1992).
Ye~ this Moses, Freud~s Moses, is a stranger to the Jewish
people inasmuch as he is not Jewish, but Egyptian - this is the
text's starting point and central thesis. In other words, Freud
grounds the Jewish tradition in the name of the other, or as one
commentator calls it, a 'blasphemous witticism' (de Certeau 1992:
314) in which the originary gesture ofseparation is expropriated.
Of this double origin, Freud will then multiply the figures (he
proposes two Moses, as well as two Gods, in fact also two different
peoples who came together in Kadesh to receive a new religion
(Freud 1985: 310), all ofwhich rests on a hidden murder, whose
traces Freud reads in the biblical narrative. Now, ifFreud identifies
with Moses, or rather identifies himself in the writing of this
Moses - the double, blasphemous, murdered, perhaps inexistent
Moses of Moses and Monotheism - then this gesture (which is
also a signature) has the paradoxical character ofa return to broken
tablets. It is the return to a religion that is at once inalienably his
own and yet from which he is estranged as a man ofscience - of
a certain science, that of the unconscious. This novel return to
the religion of the fathers is also at the same time the re-
inauguration of an exodus - not only of Freud and the psycho-
analytic movement, but in some sense also ofJudaism itself, of a
Judaism without God.
In the famous preface to the Hebrew edition of 10tem and
Taboo written eight years earlier (1930), Freud imagines an
interlocutor who asks the author, having abandoned the religion
ofhis countrymen, and also unable to share in nationalist ideals:
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'what remains to you that is Jewish?' (tWas ist an dir jiidisch?).+
Speaking in the third person (itself a significant gesture), Freud
writes: 'he would reply: '~ very great deal and probably its very
essence)} (I{Noch sehr viel wahrsheinlich die Hauptsache'j' (Freud
1985: 51). The enigmatic character of this reply opens - from a
very particular angle - the question ofpsycho-analysis as a 'Jewish
science'.3 On the one hand, when Freud testifies to the proximity
between his commitment to science and the peculiar importance
of his Jewish identit)r, he reapproprlates a certain anti-semitic
caricature of psycho-analysis. If psycho-analysis is a 'Jewish
science', this could not mean (at least for Freud) that it speaks-
only about Jewish people, or adopts a specifically Jewish stand~
point (judischen Standpunkt). Rather, it gives to read a relation
that is more enigmatic, more difficult to grasp - perhaps ofgreat~r
richness and import - yet also unstable and potentially deceptive.
(Notably, in this preface, Freud doesn't tell the complete truth
about himself Yerushalmi shows convincingly the 'inaccura~y':
for example ofhis avowed ignorance of Hebrew, the language of
the holy writ (die heilige Sprache) (Yerushalmi 1991: 64-79).) .:.
At another level, however, one might say that the deception
belongs to the very character of the self-disclosure. By adopting
the third person, Freud gives to read that he at once is and is not
the author ofhis text, the 'Godless Jew', whose scientific analysis
of the origin of religion and morality has now been translated
into the language of the holy writ (die heilige Sprache) - with, all
ofwh~t this implies. In a manner comparable then to the way in
which he describes his relation to Judaism and to the Hebrew
language, Freud betrays here also a relation to himselfand tQAlf
own text that is posthumous.
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No reader of this book will find it easy to put himself in the
emotional position (GefUlslage) ofan author who is ignorant of
the language of the holy writ (die heilige Sprache nicht versteht) ,
who is completely estranged (entfremdt) from the religion ofhis
fathers...but who has yet never renounced his people (doch die
Zugehorigkeit zu seinem Volk nit verleugnet hat), who feels that
he is in his essential nature a Jew and has no desire to alter that
nature...Thus it is an experience of a quite special kind when a
book ofhis is translated into the Hebrew language and put into
the hands of readers for whom that historic idiom is a living
tongue (cine lebende Zunge). (Freud 1985: 51)
The proclaimed solitude of this author who remains a figure of
identification - a prophetic voice of the 'new Jewry' - yet
dissimulates another solitude, which appears precisely as the
difference between Freud and the author he describes. This
solitude is 'without witness': the relation to an exteriority without
identity, without name, neither that of the scientist, nor the Jew.
Like Heidegger, Freud will also ground the historical
existence ofa people (volk) in myth, and he will also identify as
one of its distinguishing features an advance in spirituality/
intellectuality (Geistigkeit). (Freud traces the etymology of the
word Geist to the Hebrew ruah, meaning breath (Freud 1985:
361).) In a more general sense, both Heidegger and Freud struggle
to delimit the political from the position of knowledge,
encountering a limit in which the task is unaccomplished. To be
sure, with Freud, it does not take the striking form ofthe Rectorat,
where a thinker in adopting the public role of administrator
sought to take an active part in what he believed to be the spiritual
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reawakening of his nation, indeed of the West in general. Yet, in
a manner at least comparable to the texts following Heidegger's
resignation, yet with a resonance infinitely more tragic, Moses
andMonotheism witnesses the powerlessness ofa thought to effect
the actual poJitical conditions of those about whom, or in the
name of whom, it feels compelled irresistibly to respond.
Paradoxically enough, however, in this respect the text reconfirms,
in a manner that remains powerful and also moving, the tradition
whose origin and durability it seeks to analyse. In the section
entitled (The Advance ofIntellectualitylSpirituality' CFortschritt
in der Geistigkeit), Freud writes: 'The natiods political misfortune
taught it to value as its true worth the one possession that
remained to it - its literature.... From the [time ofthe destruction
of the second temple] onwards, the Holy Writ and intellectual
concern with it were what held the scattered people t9gether'
(Freud 1985: 362).4
When Lyotard comes to address in his own way the
question of Heidegger's politics, it is significant that he does so
by sitlJating a diffrrendbetween Heidegger and 'the jews' (Lyotard
1989a, 1990). In the attempt to find the 'internal logic' which
maintains the double assertion - at once of the greatness of
Heidegger's thought and the objectionable nature ofhis 'politics',
there is a silence that demands the recognition ofanother phrasal
regime. This other phrasal regime will be that of the Jewish Law,
which, according to Lyotard, disputes the Greek thinking of
Bein~ Provoking the diffirend between them is Heidegger's
infamous silence on the holocaust. The holocaust for Lyotard
(and notably also for Levinas) is an event that cannot be thought
in the language ofBeirig. To do so is to deprive the victims of the
language to articulate the wrong done to them.
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Now, it is important to underline that the existence of a
difftrend for Lyotard does not have a simply negative sense.
Inasmuch as it testifies to a certain limit of discourse - where
'what there is to be put into sentences (phraser) exceeds what
humans presently can put into sentences' (Lyotard 1983: 30) -
the diffirend demands the institution ofidioms which do not yet
exist. In the most general sense) the diffirend is an invitation to
the event - or more precisely to the question ofthe event (54rrive-
t-iN). To this question, Lyotard addresses his text - a gesture in a
sense exemplary of all texts, all acts of communication and
discourse: (To do justice (faire droit) to the diffirend is to institute
new addressees, new senders, new significations, new referents,
so that the wrong manages to express itself, and the plaintiffceases
to be a victim' (Lyotard 1983: 29). In this respect, Lyotard's
concept is very close to that of a certain deconstruction which
understands itself in similar terms. As Derrida says, in a motto
that can be read in at least two ways: 'Deconstruction is what
happens (ce qui arrive)'.
Despite the distance taken by Lyotard from the approaches
ofboth Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe to Heideggees politics (due
to what he considers to be their overly dutiful, filial relation to
Heidegger and the Greek heritage (Lyotard 1990: 75-77, 83-
94)), he nevertheless shares their refusal of a simply internal
reading, that is to say, one that analyses only the coherence of a
text's concepts without posing the questions of its margin: of its
date, hs context, its addressee(s), etc - all ofwhich overdetermine
a text historically and politically. Of course, a simply 'external'
reading is equally problematic (a history or sociology, for
example), inasmuch as it is generally powerless to measure itself
to the philosophemes it would claim to explain. Hazarding a
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discourse which is 'unstable, divided ... with no status properly
defined or prescribed in advance' (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989: 271),
these three thinkers distinguish their approaches from that of
coundessothers. But what is more important, particularly for
the few steps that I've taken here, is that in attempting to identifY
the limit between the philosophical and the political in Heidegger,
each make a critical reference to psycho-analysis. Each employ
psycho-analytic concepts (be it sometimes with a certain
hesitation and reserve) to situate the closure of a corpus and
trajectory that each recognize to be among the most powerful
and important - the 'greatese (Lacoue.Labarthe 1987: 22) or
'equal to the greatest' (Lyotard 1990: 52)) in any case
uncircumventable (incontournable) (Derrida 1982: 22) for our
time.5 As noted above, Lacoue·Labarthe employs the psycho-
analytic concept of identification ('because it is the only one we
dispose ofto designate the enjeu ofthe mimetic process' (Lyotard
1987: 122-3», Derrida employsCthose of 'Foreclosure' and
symptom (see below), while Lyotard's very concept of 'the jews'
vitally depends on an appropriation of the Freudian concept of
primary repression (Urverdrangung) (Lyotard 1990: 15-17).
'The jews' for Lyotard are not a subject of history, but a
repressed event of Western civilisation in generaL On the first
page of Heidegger and 'the jews', in a gesture which measures his
distance from the strategy of the Rectorats Rede, Lyotard averts
confusion between what he calls 'the jews' and real Jews, drawing
attention to his use of quotation marks and the lower case. (But
can. one really trust this distinction? Who after all is a real Jew?
Even if'the jews' ar~ not a people in the Heideggerian sense) they
nevertheless resemble a people, inasmuch as they are still a means
of identification.) For Lyotard, we are all potentially 'jews'
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inasmuch as we seek to rememher and to bear witness to
something constitutively forgotten in the thought of Western
Civilisation (Lyotard 1990; 3-5). As inheritors or children, ifyou
like, of the Jewish Y01k of Moses andMonotheism (Lyorardcires
this text authoritatively (1990: 21-23)), 'the jews' are an historical
fiction - distinguished from others by the obligation before the
Law which is apriori unrepresentable.6
No doubt, the concept of the difflrend itself is also on the
side of the Law, inasmuch as it is constructed in terms of a legal
discourse and a scene of litigation. In the most general sense,
Lyotard constructs this concept in order to make possible an
ethical response to silence, most particularly, to that ofthe 'victim'
deprived of the means to articulate the wrong that is done to
him or her. For Lyotard, a silence is always a 'sentence' (unephrase).
A 'sentence forms for Lyorard the basic indivisible unit of
philosophical analysis (Lyotard 1983: 9). Inasmuch as a silence
can only articulate itse1fwirhin a network ofsentences) or rather,
within a network where the linking (enchainement) of sentences
is necessary, a silence always appeals to sentences which are possible
in principle. Somewhat enigmatically, Lyotard calls this
impersonal necessity of linking: 'time. 'Time) is the name of
that necessity by virtue ofwhich there is no end to language. It
is, as one writer testifies, the condition which renders 'the murmur
inexhaustible' .7
A sentence 'takes place' (arrive). How to link onto it (enchainer
sur elle).... Now it is necessary to link 'now', another sentence
cannot not arrive, it's necessity, that is to say, time, there is no
non-sentence1 a silence is a sentence. (Lyotard 1983: 10)
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At this level, Lyotard is as close to and as far as possible from a
certain deconstruction, which also upholds in its own way this
elementary necessity oflinking {enchainement}. Derrida does not
call it 'time', but the 'promise', which in general opens the
temporal relation to the other:
There is in the simple fact that I speak a sort ofcommitment to
go to the end of the phrase, to link (enchatner), to affirm in
making a promise.... Before even deciding what I'm going to
say, I promise to speak to you, I respond to the promise to speak.
I respond ... I respond to you from the moment that I speak
and consequently I commit myself (Derrida 1992: 397-398)8
However, silence, which for Derrida cannot not be an affirmative
response, a confirmation of this elementary promise of speech,
nevertheless does not have the self-evident character of a
'sentence), as it does for Lyotard. (Lyotard defines silence as a
'negative' sentence (une phrase negative) (Lyotard 1983: 29).)
Because for Derrida language: and speech is grounded in a p.-o-
missive structure, that is to say in the most general terms in_a
structural commitment to the future and the other, the event of
silence itself is divided. Inseparable from language and speech,
silence does not take place in the present as a simple identity, but
only in addressing itself a priori to the future and to the other.
Like speech, silence is a 'trace': erasure belongs to its very
constitution, its identity is never assured. Citing Bataille in an
early essa~ Derrida writes: 'Ifthe word silence is, 'among all words',
the 'most perverse or the most poetic'; it's because feigning to
silence _(taire) sense, it says non-sense (ie non-sens), it slides and
effaces itself: doesn't-maintain itself, silences itselfnot as silence,
but as speech (parole). This sliding (glissement) betrays at once
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discourse and non-discourse' (Derrida 1978: 262, translation
modified).
Now this subtle difference between Derrida and Lyotard
plays itselfout in the manner iiJ. which each approach Heidegger's
relation to the Jewish tradition and the holocaust. At issue for
both is, among other things, an ethical response to a 'silence'
that they each at a certain moment caB a foreclosure (Verleugnung)
(Derrida 1989: 100, Lyotard 1990: 29). (Notably, Derrida will
put the term 'foreclosure' in quotation marks (Derrida 1989:
100).) Now, whereas Lyotard polarizes the relation between
Heidegger and 'the jews', for Derrida the limit between the two
is divided precisely at those moments in Heidegger's discourse
when he is closest to the tradition he 'forecloses' (Derrida 1989:
100-102).
Limiting myself to only the simplest indications of the
complex, subtle, differentiated interweaving of motifs that
characterizes Derrida's reading in OfSpirit, I recall that it is at
the nexus of the word Geist and its cognates that Heidegger at
once calls to the self-affirmation of the German University in
1933, and also, twenty years later, lets his thought be brought
into the closest proximity to the Jewish tradition and the ghosts
of the holocaust. In the Discussion ofGeorg Trakls Poetic WOrk
(1953), Heidegger determines the originary meaning of Geist as
fire (die Flamme), flame, burning (das Flammende), which in turn
determines the provenance ofevil. For Heidegger, evil is essentially
spiritual (geistlich) (Heidegger cited in Derrida 1989: 103). Now,
Derrida points out that this later determination of Geist (and in
particular ofi ts cognate geistliche) , on the one hand, deconstructs
Heidegger's earlier thinking ofthe term, but, on the other hand,
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also marks the closure of his brutal triangulation of its meaning
around the Greek, Latin and German languages: 'D.oes [this
triangle] not remain open from its very origin and by its very
structure onto what Greek and then Latin had to translate by
pneuma and spiritus, that is, the Hebrew ruah?' (Derrida 1989;
100). Derrida then recalls that it is 'possible to read a whole
tradition ofJewish thought as an inexhaustible thinking about
fire' (Derrida 1989: 101, 137). (Notably, Rosenzweig is here cited
as exemplary.) By making manifest in this manner the folds of
Heidegger's avoidance or 'foreclosure', Derrida gives to read the
complicity, in the name ofSpirit, between the fire of the hearth
and the fire of the holocaust. Such complicity, of course, brings
to mind the concept of the Unheimlich. In Being and Time,
Heidegger characterises Dasein's most primordial affective Being-
in-the-worJd as this 'uncanniness', this original being 'not-at-
home' (nicht-zu-hause sein) which lurks behind the tranquillity
ofour everyday (historical) existence (Heidegger 1962: 234).
-
In comparison with Lyotard then, Derrida's reading
involves a suspension ofjudgement - ifnot ofHeidegger's political
commitments - then of the evasions and erasures of his text.
Without Lyotard's conviction that a silence appeals to sentences
which are in principle possible (Lyotard 1983: 29), Derrida is
able to read the performative richness, the duplicity, the abyssal
resources of Heidegger's avoidances. (An investigation of the
meaning, for Heidegger, ofthe very term 'avoidance' is announced
at the beginning of OfSpirit as a major fil conducteur.) In the
cours~ofan interview, while responding to a question concerning
Heidegger's (si1e~~e~ a,bout the Nazi concentration camps, Derrida
makes the point: 'If we admit ... that the thing remains
unthinkable, that we do not yet have a discourse that can measure
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up to it ... then let us stop diagnosing the so-called silences and
making the 'resistances' and 'nonthoughts' ofjust about everyone
be confessed' (Derrida 1992: 301). From what position is it
possible to judge Heidegger's 'silence', if we admit that we do
not have a discourse to the measure of the event?
In the light ofthis question, one might be tempted to judge
Lyotard for inadequately addressing the issue, for over-hastily
condemning Heidegger (and also Derrida, see above). Yet
Lyotard's 'avoidance' - at once of this question, ,as well as
everything that might complicate his bi-polar characterisation
ofWestern'civilisation - is itselfinteresting and may be interpreted
as symptomatic. As is the case for Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida,
Blanchot and so many others, Lyotard's thought is acutely
sensitive to the spectres of the Second World War. What
differentiates him, however, (particularly from Heidegger and
Derrida) is the unambiguous character ofhis pre-occupation and
concern. It is expressed openly and directly through the
philosophical problems that motivate him, as well as the texts he
chooses and the events that he comments upon and analyses.9
In Heidegger and the jews', Lyotard is impatient and
sometimes harsh. He condemns Heidegger's 'leaden silence'
(silence de plomb) and in general everything in his philosophy
that sanctions a geopolitics or a geolinguistics, whether it be
Greco-Germanic or Eurocentric in form. Further, he reads
Heidegger's thought as symptomatic ofthe complicity ofWestern
philosophy in general with the advent of Nazism. It should be
noted in this regard that Heidegger and (thejews' first appeared as
a contribution to the debate in France that followed the
publication ofVictor Farius' Heidegger et Ie nazisme (see Lyotard
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1990: xvi). While Lyotard repudiates Farius' reduction of th~
entirety ofHeidegger's thought-to Nazi ideology, he nevertheless
maintains the fundamental complicity of the thought of the
forgetting of Being with a civilizatio~ unable to acknowledge an
unpayable debt to 'the jews'.
Now, if Lyotard's irritation and impatience - as well as his
general inability tp forgive -limits his capacity to read Heidegger,
blinding him for exarpple to the sophistication ofa reading such
as Derrida's, this might not be understood as a simple lapsus on
the part of the philosopher's sagacity and prudence. Or if it is
such a lapsus, it might be interpreted as symptomatic ofa trauma
unresolved for European thought in general. In psycho-analytic
terms, one could understand Lyotard's reading in general as a
return to this trauma, a certain experience of it, which polarizes
the relation between the Occident (responsible for the emergence
of the Nazis) and 'the jews' (for Lyotard, the custodians of the
Forgotten, at once the victims and the site ofultimate resistance).
All ofwhich would confirm the view that the war is not yet over,
but continues for example in the spectral domains ofphilosophy
and literature - as the battle for the means of appropriation of
Western thought. 10










Concerning the term 'historial' (Geschichtlich) as distinguished
from historical (historisch), see Heidegger 1962: 30,444-449.
This statement is left unchanged in the 1953 publication in
German of the 1935 lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics
(Heidegger 1959: 199).
This expression to my knowledge was never used by Freud. It
appears, however, strikingly at the conclusion of Anna Freud's
opening speech to the International Association of Psycho-
analysis held in Jerusalem (for the first time) in 1977. Speaking
ofthe various criticisms and rejections ofpsycho-analysis made
by academic institutions throughout its history, she mentions
finally the label 'Jewish science': 'However the other derogatory
comments maybe evaluated, it is, I believe, the last-mentioned
connotation which, under present circumstances, can serve as a
title of honour' (Anna Freud cited in Yerushalmi 1991: 100).
The question ofpsycho-analysis as a (Jewish science' has formed
the topic of at least two recent studies (see Yerushalmi 199 I I
Derrida 1995).
By this, I wish to suggest that the writing of Moses and
Monotheism is a response to an irrecuperable loss (at once of
the author, ofhis people and his religion), but as such it is also
a testament to the future (through a novel return to the past).
This double character of 'the nation's literature' seems to me
essential not only for'the understanding of Freud, but more
generally (de Certeau 1988, notably 316-328).
These inflections of judgement are the 'index of a silent
conversation between three thinkers who share a co~mon
language arid milieu - and who read one another;
Of course, the claim that 'the jews' are a repressed event of








However, the use of psycho-analysis to think the originsj;of
civilisation and the diagnosis of cultural malaise nevertheless
belongs to the Freudian legacy:
'Fiez-vQus au caracrere inepuisable du murmure', 'trust in the
murmur's inexhaustibility', Andre Breton cited in Maurice
Blanchot (1955: 238-239).
'I believe one must be able to say) heyond these determined
promises, that all acts of language carry a certain promise
structure (structure de promesse) , even if they do something else
at the same time. All language is addressed to the other in order
to promise to speak to him/her. Even if I do it to menace, to
injure, to hold a scientific discourse, to do anything but promise,
there is in the simple fact that I speak to the other a sort of
commitment to go to the end of the phrase, to link (enchatner),
to affirm in making a commitment (engagement), This general
structure is such that one cannot imagine a language which is
not in a certain way caught In the space ofthe promise' (Derrida
1992: 397), Significantly, Derrida will also find this thought of
the promise in Heidegger (Derrida "1989: 92..;94, 129-136).
Besides the text on Auschwitz given at Cerisy-la-salle (Lyotard
1989b: 360-392)) consider the countless examples from
revisionist historians in Le diffrrend (Lyotard 1983: 2, 26-27,
33, 48-9). Even among the earliest political essays, one finds for
example that Lyotard addresses the question of German guilt
and responsibility (Lyotard 1989: 125-131).
From this perspective, one might consider the strength of
Lyotard's intellectual identifications with Jewish thinkers such
as Freud, Levinas and Wittgenstein, who he understands as
contesting the traditions borne from the thought ofHegel and
Heidegger. Consider also Lyotard's accusation in Heidegger and
the jews' that Derridean deconstruction is not Jewish enough,
'still too pious, too respectfully nihilist', unablein anyway either
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to address or to identify with the question called ~uschwitz'
(Lyorard 1990: 75-76). It might be said that Derrida also
occasionally expresses a similar disquiet about himself! For he
identifies himself as a Converted Jew, for example as Judas in
Glas (Derrida 1986: 240b-242b), or more persistently as a
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